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Evil and the Rationality
of Christian Belief
by Michael L. Peterson
Does Evil Make Christian Belief Irrational?
The reunion of two brothers, Ivan and Alyosha Karamazov, bears
poignant expression to the problem of evil in human existence. Ivan,
a university-educated and worldly-wise man, has turned atheist over
the injustice and suffering in the world. Alyosha, in the odyssey of his
separate life, has become a faithful monk and tries to dissuade Ivan
from his all-consuming rebellion against God. But Ivan swiftly
dismantles each fragmentary answer and continues to press Alyosha
for a sufficient explanation of why God allows evil in the world.
Reduced to dumb silence, Alyosha approaches Ivan, kisses him
softly, then turns and runs back toward the monastery. As
Dostoevsky says, "It was nearly dark, and he felt almost frightened."'
Too often, Alyosha is typical ofChristian reactions to the problem
of evil: emotional response, rational retreat. As the problem of evil is
a genuine intellectual objection to Christian belief, however, it must
be faced head on.
While the problem of evil is in actuality not just one problem, but a
cluster of different problems, each having an identifiable structure
and strategy which must be examined and refuted in order to answer
completely the general problem of evil, it is the more modest task of
this article to analyze only one version of the problem � a version
that seems to emerge powerfully from the encounter of the two
Karamazovs: that evil can be employed to show Christian belief
irrational, noetically improper, and intellectually substandard.
Of course, the worry over whether or not Christian belief is
rational is only one instance of philosophical reflection on all human
beliefs. The philosophical enterprise operates on the legitimate
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principle that responsible persons do not simply have beliefs, but
follow certain guidelines which help insure that those beliefs are
adequate or true. The set of these guidelines, then, constitutes a kind of
standard of rationality, and the person following them is to that
extent rational. It is no grave embarrassment for thinking persons to
abide by these procedures and sometimes arrive at false beliefs. To do
this is simply to participate in the fallible venture of human
knowledge. But to ignore or violate these accepted parameters of
rationality is a great offense. ^
It is not uncommon to find religious believers being accused of
violating rational procedures. The determination to be made is
whether evil may be used to ground the charge that the Christian
believer is in flagrant violation of his intellectual duty and is thus
irrational. Various studies of rationality might lead one to approach
this question in several different ways. To be focused upon here is
what is believed (i.e., a set of propositions central to Christian
theism^) in the determination of whether Christian theism possesses
inherent defects which preclude one from rationally believing it. Can
the accuser in this matter � the "atheist," avoiding the term's
misleading connotations � use evil to show that the theist qua theist
is guilty of the charge of irrationality? In terms of existing criteria of
rationality, it can be convincingly argued that Christian theism is not
irrational in light of evil. One must remember, however, that to meet
this atheistic objection is not to establish that Christian theism is true
or even probably true. That would be quite another task altogether.
An apparently straightforward and promising way to approach
the question of whether evil renders belief in God irrational would be
to postulate a definition of rationality'' and see whether belief in God
conforms to it. The chief difficulty with this course is that no final
and complete definition of rationality is available. If there were such
a definition, it would contain a set of conditions which would be
severally necessary and jointly sufficient for a belief to be rational.
The absence of a universal definition of rationality alone ought to
humble the atheist and reduce his charge. However, there do seem to
be partial definitions, two of which can be carefully fashioned into
arguments from evil against the rationality of Christian theism. The
first criterion of rationality is that beliefs be logically consistent; the
second, that they be in close accord with the evidence. Hence, the




(i) Theism is logically inconsistent in its own claims about God
and evil,
or
(ii) Theism is highly improbable with respect to the evidence of
evil.
Let us call these two broad challenges the logical problem of evil and
the probabilistic problem of evil respectively,^ and consider each one
in detail.
The Logical Problem of Evil
Many contemporary authors conceive of the problem of evil as a
completely logical one. The atheistic charge is that orthodox
Christianity is self-contradictory and thus irrational in the strongest
sense. 6 Alvin Plantinga, a theist, explains that in order to establish
the charge of self-contradiction the atheist must identify a set of
propositions which both entails a contradiction and is such that each
proposition in the set is either necessarily true, essential to theism, or
a consequence of such propositions.^ Obviously the theist would
have no problem if he were not committed, on some grounds or
other, to each proposition in the set or if the set did not really entail a
contradiction. The following set of propositions is commonly cited:
1 God exists,
2 God is omnipotent,
3 God is omniscient,
4 God is omnibenevolent,
5 Evil exists.
Historically, both theists and atheists have recognized that this set or
a set quite like it constitutes a logical problem for theism. J.L.
Mackie insists that the enigma is insoluble and hence the defeat of
theism:
In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent;
God is wholly good; yet evil exists. There seems to be some
contradiction between these propositions so that if any two
of them were true the third would be false. But at the same
time all three are essential parts of most theological
positions; the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and
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cannot consistently adhere to all three. ^
Several characteristics of this problem deserve attention. First,
when posed as an a priori question of logical consistency, the
problem does not suppose any matter of fact and can be discussed,
for example, independently of other arguments for the existence of
God or the non-existence of evil. The point at issue is whether theism
contains contradictory propositions. If so, the atheist is victorious.
Second, it is interesting to note that the belief in the sheer existence of
evil is generally taken as essential to the alleged logical difficulty of
theism. Only a very few authors have attempted to formulate a
logical problem out of propositions 1 - 4 together with, say, this
proposition:
6 Large amounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing distribu
tions of evil exist.
Or propostions 1 - 4 and this proposition:
7 Unnecessary or gratuitous evil exists.
One would think that the theist would more easily be trapped in a
contradiction if he must hold 1 - 4 and either 6 or 7. Nevertheless, the
traditional formulation of the problem has centered around 5 and the
charge that 1 - 4 entail its denial, or conversely, that 5 entails the
denial of at least one proposition in the set 1 - 4.
The third interesting feature of the logical problem of evil is that
the putative contradiction does not arise immediately on the basis of
1 - 5, but only after certain additional assumptions such as the
following are made:
r God has being or independent ontological status,
2' An omnipotent being can do anything the description of
which does not involve a logical contradiction,
3' An omniscient being knows all the ways to eliminate
evil,
4' An omnibenevolent being is opposed to evil and always
seeks to eliminate it completely,
5' Evil is not logically necessary.
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Presuming that the theist is committed to 1' - 5', the rumored implicit
contradiction becomes explicit. It appears that 1 - 4 and 1' - 5' do
entail this, to which the theist is unwittingly committed:
-^5 Evil does not exist.
Yet the theist is officially committed to this statement:
5 Evil exists.
So, the atheist rightly points out that the theist cannot rationally
have it both ways. Mackie, for example, believes that only premises
2' and 4', together with 1 - 5, are needed to trap the theist in a
contradiction.^
The Theist's Rebuttal
When the structure of the atheistic challenge is laid bare in this
way, what the theist must do to rebut it seems clear. The theist must
reject one or more of the additional premises 1' - 5', or any others
which are offered. This, of course, is precisely the spirit of Western
theodicy, showing why God and God's world are different in
important if subtle ways from the descriptions in 1' - 5'. For example,
Augustine and Leibniz argue that premises such as 5' are false
because any created finite world necessarily involves some evil, and
thus, that God is not culpable for not eliminating it.'^ More recently
is the argument of C. S. Lewis, M. B. Ahern, and Alvin Plantinga
that premises such as 4' do not hold because there are morally
sufficient reasons why God might not completely eliminate all evil,
the chief reason being the preservation of free will."
Theistic resistance to various propostions in 1' - 5' demonstrates
that versions of the logical problem typically commit either of two
fallacies in trying to find a contradiction within theism: They either
beg the question by selecting propositions to which the theist is not
committed, or lift out of context propositions to which the theist is
committed, imputing new and convenient meanings to them.'^ So,
the self-contradiction strategy for indicting theism of irrationality
does not seem to be a promising avenue of atheistic attack. Of course,
there may be a self-contradiction derivable within traditional
theology, but the continued failure of atheists to produce it seems to
count heavily against the likelihood of their eventual success.
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The Probabilistic Problem of Evil
The logical problem of evil is not the only case for the irrationality
of Christian theism. Another, and increasingly popular, rendition of
the problem, of evil is that Christian theism, though not strictly
inconsistent, is improbable (implausible, unlikely, etc.). To accept a
proposition or system ofpropositions clearly disfavored by a compu
tation of relevant probabilities would be irrational in a different but
nonetheless significant sense. In this kind of probabilistic case
against theism, evil must somehow function as data or evidence for
or against theistic claims. Cornman and Lehrer offer a brief descrip
tion of the kind of world in which we live and then write:
Given this world, then, it seems, we should conclude that it is
improbable that it was created or sustained by anything
we would call God. Thus, given this particular world, it
seems that we should conclude that it is improbable that
God � who, if he exists, created the world � exists.
Consequently, the belief that God does not exist, rather than
the belief that he exists, would seem to be justified by the
evidence we find in this world.
William Rowe makes the argument more pointed:
We must then ask whether it is reasonable to believe that all
the instances of profound, seemingly pointless human and
animal suffering lead to greater goods. And, if they should
somehow all lead to greater goods, is it reasonable to believe
that an omnipotent, omniscient being could not have
brought about any of those goods without permitting the
instances of suffering which supposedly lead to them?When
we consider these more general questions in the light of our
experience and knowledge of the variety and profusion of
human and animal suffering occurring daily in our world, it
seems that the answer must be no. It seems quite unlikely
that all the instances of intense human and animal suffering
occurring daily in our world lead to greater goods, and even
more unlikely that if they all do, an omnipotent, omniscient
being could not have achieved at least some of those goods
without permitting the instances of suffering that lead to
them. In the light of our experience and knowledge of the
The Asbury Seminarian
variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our
world, the idea that none of those instances of suffering
could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without
the loss of a greater good seems an extraordinary, absurd
idea, quite beyond our belief. '^'^
These and similar arguments share at least one basic motif: On the
evidence of evil, theism is improbable, and the theist accepting it is
irrational.
Three aspects of the probabilistic problem of evil are noteworthy.
First, theism is treated as an internally consistent system which
implies factually testable assertions. Hence, one phase of the debate
must be a posteriori in nature, seeking to ascertain the facts of the
matter (e.g., what kinds of evils exist, whether they lead to greater
goods, etc.). Second, most formulations of the probabilistic
argument operate on the assumption that it is not the sheer fact that
5 Evil exists
which constitutes the negative evidence against theism. Instead they
argue that either the fact that
6 Large amounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing distribu
tions of evil exist,
or that
7 Pointless or gratuitous evil exists
does count against the basic set of theistic propositions 1 4. This
focus is quite a shift from that of the logical problem.
The third aspect of this kind of problem is that, while all versions
of it incorporate the concept of probability to cut against theistic
belief, they seldom provide precise analysis of probability so that we
can follow the pattern of argument. What, exactly, does the atheist
mean when he says that theism is improbable in light of the facts of
evil?
The scholarship on probability theory offers four popular
specifications of the concept of probability. To be inspected here as
to whether the atheist can use any of them in his argument from evil
12
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are the personalist, logical, frequency, and inductive theories of
probability.
The Personalistic Theory of Probability
The personalistic theory of probability might seem to aid the
atheist in his argument against theism. The personalists (e.g., de
Finetti,'5 R. Jeffrey, I. Hacking'^) classically hold that for each
person there is a credence function (between the real numbers 0 and
1) which records the degree to which that person believes a given
proposition relative to his own already accepted beliefs. Personalists
sometimes claim to be able to measure a person's degree of belief by
involving him in certain betting situations. The atheist wishing to
phrase his probabilistic argument from evil in personalistic terms
would have to maintain that the probability (as thus defined) of 1 - 4
on, perhaps, 7 is less than .5 (or 50 percent). But what really has
transpired here? All that is being claimed is that a given person,
presumably the atheist in question, has an assemblage of background
beliefs (call it noetic structure) which leads him to conclude that the
probability of 1 - 4 in light of 7 is low.
We can pass over the notorious difficulties in assigning
quantitative measures to beliefs and simply point out the highly
arbitrary nature of any measure at all. At best the probability value
records nothing more than a piece of biographical information about
the atheist, but certainly nothing about the qualities of theism itself
or the theist's acceptance of it. In fact, given the theist's own noetic
structure, theism has a fairly high credence function in spite of the
facts of evil. The point here is simply that how well a proposed belief
fares with a given person depends on what other beliefs he already
happens to hold. On this criterion, it would be irrational for a person
to believe that
8 Whales are mammals
if prior beliefs such as
9 All sea creatures are fish,
or
10 No mammals live in the sea
13
The Asbury Seminarian
were part of his noetic structure. What background beUefs one
happens to hold, how he comes to hold them, or how he could ever
revise them, are questions which are utterly ignored. Yet, settling
these issues is crucial, giving a respectable case for the irrationality of
theism. So the personalistic interpretation of probability can hardly
be used to show that theistic belief is irrational. One's next hunch at
this point may be that a person's subjective belief must at least
roughly correspond to some objective value which attaches to the
propositions under consideration.
The Logical Interpretation of Probability
The logical interpretation of probability appears to be a more
promising avenue of atheistic attack. Those who hold a logical
concept of probability (e.g., R. Carnap'^ and R. Swinburne'^)
describe probability as a completely objective relation holding
between or among given propositions. One's degree of belief, then, is
rational only if it conforms to the actual degree of probability of the
proposition in question. For example, the rational degree of belief,
i.e. the credence function, of
1 1 Jones can swim,
given
12 Nine out of ten Hoosiers can swim and Jones is a
Hoosier,
should be .9 (or 90 percent), provided one has no other relevant
knowledge. Following this interpretation of probability, the atheist
must hold that the probability of 1 - 4, given perhaps 7, is again less
than .5.
But how can the atheist legitimately claim that the set of
propositions 1 - 4, given proposition 7, just have a low probability?
What is the rule or criterion for assigning probability in these cases?
Does one just see the correct probability, consult other relevant
knowledge, or what? If the latter is done, then the atheist's other
beliefs must be brought up for scrutiny, their respective probabilities
checked, and so on. It is just not clear that all contingent propositions
have a logical probability, that there is a method for determining
whether they do, or that 7 would disconfirm 1 - 4 anyway. Thus, there
14
Evil and the Rationality of Christian Belief
is certainly no auspicious attack from evil which can be generated
from the purely logical concept of probability.
The Frequency Theory of Probability
The frequency theory of probability may seem to offer some help
at this point. The frequentists (e.g., H. Reichenbach2o and W.
Salmon^') hold that probability expresses a ratio or proportion of
events of one kind among events of another kind. An insurance
actuary, for example, might find that the frequency with which death
occurs among American males under thirty-five years of age is 50 out
of 1000, or 5 percent. Hence, the probability of the proposition
13 An American male will die before his thirty-fifth
birthday
is a very low .05.
Those who work with statistical frequencies, however, are
familiar with the difficulties which plague the formation of a
completely adequate method. One problem is obtaining proper
samples of the two classes of events. A second problem is correctly
extrapolating the observed samples to the unobserved cases. And a
third � a notoriously difficult one � is that of the single case, that
unique event for which no reference class at all can be found.
When the issue concerns the probability of theism, the problems
are particularly exacerbating. How can we observe, for example, the
relative frequency with which other worlds containing evils (similar
to the evils we know) are also divinely created, such that we can
ascertain the probability that this world is created by deity? Our
world is the most difficult "single case" for which we have no other
similar actual cases constituting a relevant reference class. At our
feeble best, we can concoct possible worlds or analogous cases and
try to draw some fragmentary conclusions.
Creating analogous cases from previous knowledge or experience,
however, revives the skeletons in the personalist's closet and totally
skirts the crucial issues at the foundation of the general frequency
view. Such a maneuver simply opens the door through which the
theist and atheist may come to perfectly legitimate, but quite
different, conclusions. It appears, then, that the frequency
interpretation of probability offers the atheist no help in arguing for
the strong improbability of theism.
15
The Asbury Seminarian
The Inductive Theory of Probability
The inductive theory of probabiUty pertains to the hkelihood that
a hypothesis is true in Hght of relevant factual evidence. Some
authors attempt to assign quantitative probability value to
hypotheses, but the majority of them believe that ordinary
qualitative values are appropriate (e.g., "low," "high," etc.). At any
rate, all of these authors (e.g., C. HempeP^ and K. Popper^s)
interpret probability to be closely associated with scientific
procedures. Basically, scientific induction consists in deriving the test
implications of a given hypothesis and then checking (e.g., by
observation, experiment, etc.) whether the anticipated results occur.
Suppose that we are in ancient times and want to test the hypothesis
that
14 The earth is round.
The hypothesis H by itself does not yield readily testable statements
T, but does so only upon the addition of some assumption(s) A, such
as
15 Lunar eclipses are due to the earth's shadow cast upon
the moon.
Now, from 14 and 15 it clearly follows^^ that
16 Lunar eclipses are round shaped.
The structure of reasoning here may be schematized like this:
[H + A] > T
evidence tends to confirm T
Therefore, probably H,
where H = 14, A = 15, and T = 16. On the other hand, if the evidence
disconfirms T, the probability of H decreases, and on the schema
looks like this:
[H + AJ > T
evidence tends to confirm '^T
Therefore, probably '^H.
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On this scheme, the atheist must argue that theism, when treated as
a hypothesis, possesses a very low probability on the evidence of evil.
As we have already seen, 1 - 4 do not straightforwardly imply
anything about God's disposition of evil, and do so only when
conjoined with at least one additional assumption. Since there may
be good reasons for God to allow not just the sheer existence of evil,
but great amounts and variety of evil, the strongest atheistic attack
would include the assumption that
17 God would not allow unnecessary or gratuitous evil
to exist. 25
Gratuitous evils, to stipulate, are those evils which are not directly
and specifically compensated by greater goods. Clearly, from 1 - 4as
the initial theistic hypothesis, together with 17 as an auxiliary
assumption, it follows that
7 Unnecessary or gratuitous evil does not exist.
Mounted on the schema, the atheist's reasoning takes this form:
[(1)-(4) = (17)] >( 7)
probably~ ('^7), or (7)
Therefore, probably ^^[(1) - (4)].
Since it seems plausible and perhaps probable that 7 � the
contradictory of the expected test implication ^1� is the case,^^ the
probability of 1 - 4 is reduced accordingly. Hence, the person
believing 1 - 4 would appear to be irrational, and must give up at least
one of these four claims.
Problems with the Inductive Approach
Although this inductive approach to probability provides the most
respectable argument from evil (an argument whose method is
reminiscent of corresponding theistic arguments within the tradition
of natural theology) theists are still not without adequate reply. The
difficulties of the atheist's case may be revealed simply by noting




First, there is the problem of ascertaining the occurrence or non
occurrence of the test implication: Were the instruments accurate,
the reports reliable? In the atheist's argument, then, he faces the
enormous task of determining the truth of 7. Evils which appear
gratuitous may not really be gratuitous, particularly if one's
perspective changes, or if a longer time-span is allowed. At best, the
atheist can make a plausible case for the claim that some evils are
really gratuitous. The theist can counter, as many theists have done
in the long tradition of Western theodicy, with explanations ofwhy
those evils are not really gratuitous.
The second difficulty in the atheist's case is that the assumption
needed to deduce the test consequence is not itself beyond question.
It is true that the majority of theists agree with the atheists that the
following is a fair assumption:
1 7 God would not allow unnecessary or gratuitous evils to
exist.
This accounts for the fact that most theistic rebuttals of the atheistic
challenge focus on defeating the factual premise 7 and not 17. There
is also room, however, for calling 17 into question. For example, it is
imaginable that God might allow gratuitous evils to exist if
eliminating them meant precluding either the actuality or possibility
of greater goods (e.g., God might allow the painful consequences of a
physically violent act in order not to curtail the scope of human
freedom). Moreover, God might allow numerous trivial evils to exist
gratuitously while directing his providential activity to more
significant evils.
Last, it might even be argued that God could allow significant evils
to exist gratuitously, without any form of compensation, and that
this is part of what it means to have a world which is lost. God may
ultimately redeem persons affected by those evils, but need not
meticulously compensate for every earthly event labeled evil. The
upshot of these probings is simply that assumption 17, which the
atheist needs in order for his argument to go through, is not above
question.
There is yet a deeper problem with the atheistic attack under
consideration. An established requirement for the final evaluation of
any hypothesis is that the total body of available evidence be
consulted. In the present case, evil is certainly one important and
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impressive piece of evidence, but is by no means the only relevant
evidence. As long as the atheist insists on testing theism as a kind of
hypothesis, then he must also inspect the large number and variety of
goods present in the world, as well as a wide range of historical and
existential considerations, which might well yield a high probability
for theism. Unless the apparently falsifying evidence of evil is
conclusive, which, as we have just seen, it is not, then the inductive
appraisal of theism does not look nearly so dim for the theist, but
may actually backfire on the atheist. At least the atheist can no longer
charge that theism is clearly irrational by virture of being wildly
improbable.
Finally, a Matter of Terms
The conclusion ofour investigation must be that the atheist cannot
use evil to show that Christian belief is irrational, if by the term
"irrational" he means either "logically inconsistent" or "highly
improbable." Since there are no other clear and accepted meanings
for the term, it appears that the atheistic program here is totally
misconceived. Upon close examination, the charge that theism is
irrational turns out to be nothing more than a bit of intellectual
imperialism on the part of the atheist. If the chastised atheist would
like to venture the substitute thesis that, in light of the facts of evil.
Christian belief is false rather than downright irrational, there would
emerge a different and more fruitful debate. Of course, the
recalcitrant atheist might still think that theism is irrational and
claim to have other good arguments to prove it. The argument from
evil, however, is not among them. 2'' �
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